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NOTABLE STUDENT WORKS
A View Against Strict Employer Liability
Under Title VII for Sexually Offensive
Work Environments Created by
Supervisory Personnel: Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson
I. Introduction
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized
a wide difference in the respective destinies of man and woman.
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The nat-
ural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the fe-
male sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life. The constitution of the family organization, which is
founded in the divine ordinance, as well as the nature of things,
indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to
the domain and functions of womanhood.
1
The quotation above epitomizes the stereotypical view of the
role of women prior to the twentieth century. Today's society has
brought with it a dramatic change in the legal and socioeconomic
status of women,2 yet many traditional stereotypes still remain.
Women comprise approximately forty percent of the work force in
the United States today,3 and the number is rapidly increasing. The
rising number of women entering the work force yields a proportion-
ate increase in the problems that women encounter on the job be-
cause of gender-based discrimination. One form of discrimination is
sexual harassment." Sexual harassment in the workplace is a major
I. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
2. Note, Differing Standards of Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment of Working
Women, 27 ARIz. L. REV. 155 (1945).
3. M. COELI MEYER, J. OESTRIECH. F. COLLINS, T. BERCHTOLD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT 3
(1981) [hereinafter COELI MEYER].
4. The term sexual harassment is difficult to define and is frequently discussed by means
of examples. Sexual harassment may include verbal abuse, sexist remarks regarding a woman's
clothing or body, patting, pinching, or brushing up against a woman's body, leering or ogling,
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problem confronting women in today's society. 5 It denies women the
same working conditions that are enjoyed by similarly situated men.6
A body of law has developed holding employers primarily responsible
for allowing this problem. This paper will provide an overview of the
development of this area of law and will examine the standards used
to evaluate employer liability for sexual harassment by supervisors,
coworkers and nonemployees. The possible implications arising from
the first sexual harassment case accepted by the United States Su-
preme Court will also be considered.'
II. History of Sexual Harassment
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19648 makes it an unlawful
employment practice for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex or national origin."9 The legislative history of the 1972
amendments to Title VII reveals that Congress desired the statute to
be broadly construed, in order to eliminate sex based discrimination
in employment."0 Eventually the courts recognized that sexual har-
assment constitutes discrimination based on sex, and is therefore
prohibited by Title VII."1
The roots of a claim under Title VII for sexual harassment can
demand for sexual favors in return for hiring, promotion or tenure, physical assault or rape. Id.
at 4.
5. A report on a number of surveys shows that between 49 to 90% of women in various
occupations surveyed reported experiencing sexual harassment at work. C. MACKINNON. SEX-
UAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 26-32 (1979). It should be noted that sexual harass-
ment is a problem experienced by men as well as women. A study conducted by two UCLA
psychologists in 1979 which included men and women in the Los Angeles area revealed that
47% of the women surveyed experienced admiring sexual comments on the job as compared
with 45% of the men surveyed, 33% of the women experienced leering or touching as com-
pared with 31% of the men, and I1% of the women stated that they were expected to sleep
with the boss or an influential coworker to keep their jobs as compared with 6% of the men.
COELI, MEYER, supra note 3 at 5.
6. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd and remanded on
other grounds sub nom; Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1976), decision on remand
sub nom; Williams v. Civiletti, 487 F. Supp. 1387 (D.D.C. 1980).
7. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), reh'g denied 760 F.2d 1330 (D.C.
Cir. 1985), aff'd and remanded sub nom., Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct.
2399 (1986) [hereinafter Vinson v. Taylor].
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982) [hereinafter Title VII].
9. Id.
10. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 658 (D.D.C. 1976); see also Note, The Dehu-
manizing Puzzle of Sexual Harassment: A Survey of the Law Concerning Harassment of
Women in the Workplace, 24 WASH. L.J. 575, 580 (1985).
II. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
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generally be traced to Corne v. Bausch and Lomb, Inc.12 In Corne,
the female plaintiffs complained that the repeated verbal and physi-
cal advances of their male supervisor caused them to leave their jobs.
They sued both the supervisor and the employer, Bausch and Lomb,
alleging that the supervisor's persistent sexual advances had become
a condition of their employment within the meaning of Title VII. 1"
The plaintiffs also asserted that the employer was subject to liability
under Title VII for permitting the advances to continue.14 The court
granted both the supervisor's and the employer's motion to dismiss,
holding that sexual advances do not constitute sex discrimination. 5
In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that the supervi-
sor's conduct constituted nothing more than "personal proclivity, pe-
culiarity or mannerism," and that he was doing nothing more than
"satisfying a personal urge."' 6 With respect to the employer's liabil-
ity, the court held that, because the employer would in no way bene-
fit from the supervisor's unsavory personal conduct, the alleged har-
assment was not employment related, and therefore the employer
had not discriminated on the basis of sex.' 7
In Williams v. Saxbe,18 decided only one year after Corne, the
District Court for the District of Columbia recognized sexual harass-
ment as sex based discrimination prohibited by Title VII. In Wil-
liams, the plaintiff alleged that after she rebuffed a sexual advance
made by her supervisor, the supervisor's attitude towards her
changed dramatically. She asserted that prior to the rejected sexual
advance the working relationship with her supervisor was good, but
after the rejected advance the supervisor engaged in a continuing
pattern and practice of sexual harassment. 9 The plaintiff was dis-
charged approximately three months after the alleged sexual ad-
vance, purportedly because of poor work performance. ° The defend-
ants argued that the plaintiff had not been denied employment
12. 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated without opinion, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir.
1977). While most commentators suggest that the seminal case for a sexual harassment claim
under Title VII is Come, see Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C.
1974), revd sub nora. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The court granted
summary judgment in favor of defendant on the ground that Title VIi does not offer redress
for a plaintiffs claim that her job was terminated because she refused her male supervisors
sexual advances.
13. 390 F. Supp. at 162.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 163-64.
16. Id. at 163.
17. Id.
18. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976).
19. Id. at 655-66.
20. Id.
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opportunity because she was a woman, but because she was unwill-
ing to perform the alleged sexual demands. The defendants further
asserted that the "plaintiff is in no different class from other employ-
ees, regardless of their gender or sexual orientation, who are made
subject to such carnal demands." 2' The court rejected this argument
as excessively narrow, stating that it failed to recognize that "The
conduct of the plaintiff's supervisor created an artificial barrier to
employment which was placed before one gender and not the other,
despite the fact that both genders were similarly situated."22
The decision in Williams v. Saxbe laid the foundation for other
courts to recognize that sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimi-
nation within the meaning of Title VII. Since that decision, a sub-
stantial majority of the courts now follow the lead of Williams v.
Saxbe, broadly construing Title VII to carry out the congressional
intent of eliminating discrimination based on sex.2"
III. Types of Sexual Harassment
Courts have generally recognized two distinct categories of sex-
ual harassment under Title VII.2 The classic example of sexual har-
assment is characterized as quid pro quo. Quid pro quo sexual har-
assment occurs when a tangible loss of job benefits is involved, as in
the case of a supervisor making sexual demands upon a subordinate
in exchange for career advantages or under threat of adverse job
consequences. 25 The second category of sexual harassment has been
characterized as environmental. Environmental sexual harassment
occurs when the employee is subjected to sexually related conduct
which interferes with the work performance or which creates an in-
timidating, hostile or offensive working environment, regardless of
whether the employee is threatened with actual economic
consequences.26
21. Id. at 657 (quoting Defendant's Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss).
22. Id. at 657-58.
23. See. e.g., Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d
251 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (1lth Cir. 1982); Kyriazi v.
Western Electric Co., 461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978).
24. See Note, supra note 10.
25. Downes v. FAA, 775 F.2d 288, 290 (Fed. Cir. 1985). When an unwanted sexual
advance occurs, quid pro quo harassment can take on one of three possible shapes. In situation
one the woman declines the advance and forfeits an employment opportunity; the scenario is
usually: sexual advance, noncompliance, employment retaliation. In situation two, the woman
complies and does not receive a job benefit. In situation three, the woman complies and re-
ceives the job benefit. See MACKINNON, supra note 5 at 32.
26. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 144-45 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Bundy v. Jackson, 641
F.2d 934, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
1160
LIABILITY UNDER TITLE VII
Prior to 1981 the courts recognized that only the quid pro quo
form of sexual harassment presented a claim for sex based discrimi-
nation under Title VII.27 The landmark case of Bundy v. Jackson2 8
however, established that "conditions of employment" include the
psychological and emotional work environment and that sexually
stereotyped insults and demeaning propositions which poison that en-
vironment may result in an actionable claim for sexual harassment
under Title VII.29
In Bundy, plaintiff's immediate supervisor subjected her to re-
peated inquiries about her sexual proclivities, numerous sexual ad-
vances and a request to join him at a motel and on a business trip to
the Bahamas. When Bundy complained to a higher authority, that
supervisor replied that "any man in his right mind would want to
rape you" and then proceeded himself to make sexual advances to-
wards her." ° In an opinion by Chief Justice Wright, the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found, for the first
time, that a claim for sexual harassment under Title VII need not
involve any threatened loss of tangible job benefits. Blazing a new
trail for relief under Title VII, the court opined:
[U]nless we extend the Barnes holding, an employer could sexu-
ally harass a female employee with impunity by carefully stop-
ping short of firing the employee or taking any other tangible
action against her in response to her resistance, thereby creating
the impression . . . that the employer did not take the ritual of
harassment and resistance seriously.5 '
After Bundy, courts generally recognize the insufficiency of a
legal theory of sexual harassment that does not allow a context of
unwarranted advances to be actionable. Such a theory would effec-
tively permit all sexual harassment that stops short of a victim quit-
ting or being fired.32 One well known authority also criticizes the
27. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934.
Though no court has yet so held, we believe that an affirmative answer fol-
lows ineluctably from numerous cases finding Title VII violations where an em-
ployer created or condoned a substantially discriminatory work environment, re-
.gardless of whether the complaining employees lost any tangible job benefits as a
result of the discrimination.
Id. at 943-44.
28. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
29. Id. at 944.
30. Id. at 940.
31. Id. at 945.
32. See, e.g., Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 145 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Jeppson v. Wun-
nicke, 611 F. Supp. 78, 83 (D. Alaska 1985); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908, n.
12 (11th Cir. 1982).
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construction that no series of sexual advances alone is sufficient to
justify legal intervention until it is expressed in the quid pro quo
form, admonishing that this "forces the victim to bring intensified
injury upon herself in order to demonstrate that she is injured at
all." 3
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter
EEOC) guidelines" have also adopted the position that a sexual har-
assment claim under Title VII does not require the loss of tangible
job benefits. While these guidelines are only regulations, the United
States Supreme Court has indicated that they are to be given "great
deference." 3 5 The EEOC guidelines have adopted a very broad defi-
nition of sexual harassment. According to the guidelines:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute
sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made
either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individ-
ual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct
by an individual is used as the basis of employment decisions
affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work per-
formance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment.36
While it is difficult to precisely define all of the conduct that
may constitute sexual harassment, one commentator suggests that
any unsolicited non-reciprocal male behavior that asserts a woman's
sex role over her function as a worker is sexual harassment. 37 Courts
have generally taken a case by case approach in deciding if the al-
leged conduct falls within the definition;38 but it is clear that even
under the broad EEOC guidelines there exist some limitations in de-
fining conduct which will constitute sexual harassment. Sexual har-
assment must be "unwelcomed"; that is, the employee must not have
solicited or incited the conduct, and she must have regarded the con-
duct as offensive and undesirable.39 The conduct also must affect a
33. See MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 46-47.
34. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1984).
35. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); but see General Electric v.
Gilber, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (guidelines given mere consideration).
36. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1984).
37. L. FARELY, SEXUAL SHAKE DOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE
JOB at 14-15 (1978).
38. See F, Suggs, Advising Your Corporate Client on Avoiding Charges of Sexual Har-
assment, 46 ALA. LAW. 176, 177 (July, 1985) (suggesting that the decision of what constitutes
sexual harassment depends on the totality of the circumstances).
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1984).
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term or condition of employment or be a "basis" for employment
decisions."0 Furthermore, if the conduct does not affect employment,
it does not fall within the definition of sexual harassment.'
In deciding these cases, courts generally utilize a totality of cir-
cumstances approach in evaluating what constitutes sexual harass-
ment. 42 Factors such as the extent to which the conduct affected the
terms and conditions of employment, whether the conduct is re-
peated or isolated, whether the conduct was intended or perceived
seriously or in jest, and the degree to which the conduct is contrary
to community standards, are considered in determining whether the
conduct constitutes sexual harassment.4
IV. Establishing a Cause of Action for Sexual Harassment
Most commentators suggest that all sexual harassment claims
are examined under a disparate treatment theory.44 The courts, how-
ever, seem to employ different standards for evaluating sexual har-
assment cases under Title VII, depending on whether the case falls
into the quid pro quo category or the hostile work environment cate-
gory. In quid pro quo cases the courts consistently have employed
disparate treatment analysis because the discrimination almost al-
ways occurs in a one-on-one setting. 5 In hostile work environment
cases, however, the courts tend to proceed under a disparate impact
type of theory. 4' This may occur because, in certain situations, the
conduct has an effect not only on a particular individual, but on an
entire class of individuals. Consequently, the type of sexual harass-
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Suggs, supra note 38.
43. See Suggs, supra note 38, at 177-78.
44. Bryan, Sexual Harassment as Unlawful Discrimination Under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 14 Loy. L. REV. 25, 39 (1980).
45. See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) where
the Court addressed the allocation of proof in a private, non class action challenging employ-
ment discrimination under Title VI1. The Court found that in a racial discrimination case the
individual must establish:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority,
(ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants,
(iii) that, despite his qualifications he was rejected, and,
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
When the individual has established these elements, the burden shifts to the employer to artic-
ulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.
46. For an interesting discussion of why the analytical framework of a disparate treat-
ment analysis is more adaptable to the harassing work environment situation, see Note, Sexual
Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1449,
1456 (1984).
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ment may become important in determining the particular analysis
under which the court will proceed.
Although many commentators suggest that the courts apply
these standards in sexual harassment cases, the evaluation really de-
pends on the particular facts of a given case.4 7 To date, the courts
have not uniformly established a clear standard which can be applied
neatly in every case. In Henson v. City of Dundee,48 however, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals attempted to clarify the elements
needed to establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment. Accord-
ing to the court in Henson, in order for an employee to prove a
prima facie case, the employee must show that: (1) the employee
belongs to a protected group; (2) the employee was subjected to un-
welcome sexual harassment; and (3) the harassment complained of
was based upon sex.4 9 Once the plaintiff has established the exis-
tence of these elements, the burden shifts to the employer to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff's alleged employ-
ment related harms were not the result of sexual harassment.50 It is
interesting to note that although Henson was an environmental har-
assment case, the court purported to decide the issues applying a
disparate treatment analysis. The court simply modified the prima
facie standards set forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Doug-
las v. Green51 to fit this particular pattern of facts.
V. Employer Liability for Acts of Third Parties
Individuals who engage in harassing conduct may be held indi-
vidually liable under the tort theories of assault, battery, invasion of
privacy, interference with contractual relations, and intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress. 52 Employers, however, also may be held
accountable under Title VII for the actions of both employees and
non-employees. 53 When a claimant brings a sexual harassment claim
under Title VII, the employer is typically joined with the harassing
individual as a defendant. The federal district court in which the
action is brought adjudicates the Title VII claim and may proceed to
exercise pendent jurisdiction over the tort claims, assuming that both
47. See Suggs, supra note 38, and accompanying text.
48. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
49. Id. at 903.
50. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 951.
51. 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see supra notes 45-46, and accompanying text.
52. See Note, supra note 10, at 597.
53. See, e.g., Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141; Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654;
EEOC v. Sage Realty, 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts. 4 It is impor-
tant to recognize that Title VII only provides certain limited reme-
dies, including reinstatement with back pay, and injunctions. 55 Addi-
tionally, Title VII permits a claimant to recover attorneys fees but
does not allow recovery of punitive damages. 56 Consequently, the
strategy of joining the individual and the employer in a suit brought
under Title VII allows the claimant to also recover compensatory
damages, as well as possible punitive damages against the individual
under the pendent tort claim. At the same time, the claimant is com-
pensated for any adverse employment consequences which flow from
the individual's conduct. While it is clear that employers may be
liable under Title VII for the actions of supervisors, coworkers and
even non-employees, 57 it is unclear under what circumstances liabil-
ity will be imputed to the employer.
Section 706(g) of Title VII authorizes judicial relief if the un-
lawful employment practice is found to be intentional. That section
provides in pertinent part:
If the [district] court finds that the respondent [to the unlawful
employment practice charge] has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice
charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent
from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate."8
In discussing the amendment to Title VII, Senator Hubert H.
Humphrey (D. Minnesota) described the change in Section 706(g)
and the intent requirement as follows:
Section 706(g) is amended to require a showing of intentional
violation of the title in order to obtain relief. This is a clarifying
change. Since the title bars only discrimination because of race,
color, religion, sex, or natural [sic] origin it would seem already
to require intent, and thus the proposed change does not involve
any substantive change in the title. The express requirement of
intent is designed to make it wholly clear that inadvertent or
54. See Note, supra note 10, at 596. The "common nucleus of operative facts" require-
ment for pendent jurisdiction is almost always met since both the federal and state claims
result from the individual's conduct.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982); see also, Note, Kyriazi v. General Electric Co.:
Damages for Sexual Harassment Title VII and State Tort Law, 10 CAP. U.L. REv. 657, 662
(1981).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982). For a discussion of damages recoverable under Title
VII, see generally Note, supra note 55.
57. See infra notes 63, 72, 85 and accompanying text.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
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accidental discriminations will not violate the title or results in
entry of court orders. It means simply that the respondent must
have intended to discriminate."
The United States Supreme Court has also repeatedly ruled
that "proof of discriminatory motive is critical" in disparate treat-
ment cases under section 703(a)(1).60 Because sexual harassment is
generally treated under a disparate treatment analysis,61 proof of
discriminatory intent would seem to be required by the statute. The
courts, however, have not adopted a steadfast rule for determining
under what circumstances intent will be imputed to the employer for
the actions of third parties. As a result, different standards have
been used to evaluate the employer's liability under Title VII, de-
pending on the identity of the individual who engaged in the harass-
ing conduct, and the type of sexual harassment alleged. 2
The courts which have addressed the issue of employer liability
for harassment by non-employees have generally agreed that liability
is limited to situations where the employer had actual or constructive
notice of the conduct and failed to remedy it. The decision in EEOC
v. Sage Realty 3 is instructive in this area. In that case the employer
required a female lobby attendant to wear a revealing uniform dur-
ing working hours.64 The uniform solicited unwelcomed sexual com-
ments and gestures from passersby. 65 The plaintiff informed the em-
ployer that she would no longer wear the uniform because of the
harassing comments and questions it incited." The employer then
gave the plaintiff an ultimatum, requiring her either to wear the uni-
form or to face termination.67 The plaintiff chose instead to quit her
job. The court held that the employer was liable since it knew of the
sexual harassment and did nothing to prevent it. The court reasoned
that the employer had imposed a condition of employment on the
plaintiff by requiring her to remain in a position where she would be
59. 110 Cong. Rec. 12723-24 (June 4, 1964).
60. See. e.g., International Bd. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977);
see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1983); Furn Co. Construction
v. Walters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978) (holding that the absence of showing a discriminatory
intent required reversal of the court of appeals' order that the employer alter a certain hiring
practice).
61. See supra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 63, 68-69, 81-82, 84, 95 and accompanying text.
63. 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
64. Id. at 604.
65. Id. at 605.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 606.
LIABILITY UNDER TITLE VII
subjected to sexual harassment while working.68
The EEOC guidelines are in accord with the court's holding in
Sage. The guidelines provide:
An employer may also be liable for the acts of nonemployees,
with respect to sex harassment of employees in the workplace,
where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees)
knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to take
immediate and appropriate corrective action. In reviewing these
cases the commission will consider the extent of the employers
control and any other legal responsibility which the employer
may have with respect to the conduct of such nonemployees.
69
The guidelines do not expressly mention the intent requirement
expressed in section 706(g) of Title VII. 70 Nevertheless, it would ap-
pear from the Sage decision, and the guidelines themselves, that in-
tent to discriminate will be imputed to an employer only where the
employer is aware or should be aware of harassing conduct by a non-
employee and fails to remedy the situation.
Similarly, in the case of sexual harassment by non-supervisory
employees, the courts and the EEOC are generally in agreement that
the employer must have actual or constructive notice of the harass-
ing conduct to impose liability under Title VII. 1 In Katz v. Dole,2
the plaintiff was an air traffic controller. The working atmosphere
was pervaded with insult and innuendo, and the plaintiff was person-
ally the object of verbal sexual harassment by her fellow control-
lers. 73 The plaintiff's supervisors were alerted to the problem and one
supervisor heard other controllers referring to the plaintiff in an ob-
scene manner.7 4 In addressing the issue of employer liability, the
court held that in addition to proving her prima facie case, the plain-
tiff also must show that the employer knew or should have known of
the harassment and took no effectual action to correct the situa-
tion.75 The court stated that because the harassment was so perva-
sive and the plaintiff specifically complained of the conduct to the
management, the employer was or should have been aware of the
problem. 6 The court then proceeded to find the employer liable for
68. Id. at 609.
69. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1984).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
71. See Suggs, supra note 38, at 179.
72. 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983).
73. Id. at 254.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 256.
76. Id.
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its failure to remedy the situation effectively, in spite of the presence
of an official policy against harassment."
In Kyriazi v. Western Electric Co.,78 the District Court of New
Jersey found the employer liable for the actions of coemployees who
shot rubberbands at the plaintiff, engaged in boisterous speculations
about her virginity, and circulated an obscene cartoon depiction of
her.79 The court concluded that because two supervisors knew of the
conduct and failed to stop it, liability was fairly imputed to the
employer. 80
Other courts have also found employers liable for the harassing
conduct of nonsupervisory employees of which the employer had no-
tice but which it failed to remedy. 81 The EEOC guidelines are in
accord with the position adopted by the courts, providing for em-
ployer liability with respect to conduct between fellow employees
where the employer is or should be aware of the conduct and fails to
take appropriate corrective action.82
While the courts and the EEOC are in general agreement about
employer liability for acts of nonemployees and coworkers, substan-
tial disparity exists in the area of employer liability for the actions of
supervisory personnel. The confusion exists because Title VII's defi-
nition of "employer" includes "any agent" of the employer, and su-
pervisors are the employer's agents in the supervision of employees.83
Therefore, the question becomes whether the supervisor and the em-
ployer are a single entity so that liability is automatically imputed to
the employer, or whether the employer must have some independent
actual or constructive knowledge of the supervisor's conduct in order
for liability to be imputed to it. Considering the statutory intent re-
quirement of section 706(g), this question becomes even more
perplexing.
Most of the circuit courts which have addressed the question of
employer liability for sexual harassment by supervisors have gener-
ally concluded that the employer must be placed on notice of the
77. Id.
78. 461 F. Supp. 355 (D.N.J. 1979), affd 647 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1981).
79. Id. at 834-35.
80. Id. at 941.
81. See, e.g., Continental Can v. Minnesota, 297 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1980).
82. 29 C.F.R. 1604.11(d) (1984).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). This section provides in pertinent part:
The term employer means a person engaged in an industry affecting com-
merce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty
or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent
of such a person ....
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harassment and have an opportunity to cure it.8' In Henson v. City
of Dundee,85 the plaintiff sought to impose liability on the employer
for a harassing work environment created by her supervisor. The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that, in such a situation,
the plaintiff "must show that the employer knew or should have
known of the harassment" and failed to remedy it.8" The court fur-
ther opined that a plaintiff can demonstrate employer knowledge by
"showing that she complained to higher management of the harass-
ment, or by showing the pervasiveness of the harassment, which
gives rise to an inference of knowledge or constructive knowledge. '"87
In Craig v. Y and Y Snacks, Inc.,88 the plaintiff alleged that she
was discharged as a result of refusing the sexual advances of her
supervisor. She also notified the company's president of her dis-
charge and of her suspicion that it resulted from the incident with
her supervisor. 89 In holding the employer liable for the supervisor's
harassment and subsequent discharge of the plaintiff, the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals pointed out that the corporate president "had
actual notice of the discharge and failed to take adequate remedial
steps." 90
This finding may have been influenced by the decision in
Bundy,9 the case in which the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals imposed liability on the employer because agency officials
had "full notice of the harassment committed by agency supervisors
and did virtually nothing to stop or remedy it."92 In reaching this
conclusion, the court in Bundy suggested that under its earlier deci-
sion in Barnes v. Costle,93 the employer would not be liable if the
supervisor had acted in contravention of employer policy, without the
employer's knowledge, and the employer had promptly rectified the
situation.9'
In contrast to these decisions, some circuit courts have held em-
ployers strictly liable for the actions of their supervisors. In Miller v.
Bank of America,95 the plaintiff alleged that she was fired for rebuff-
84. See Note, supra note 2, at 160.
85. 680 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
86. Id. at 905.
87. Id.
88. 721 F.2d 77 (3d Cir. 1983).
89. Id. at 78-79.
90. Id. at 80.
91. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
92. Id. at 943.
93. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
94. Bundy v. Jenkins, 641 F.2d 934, 943 (citing Barnes, 561 F.2d at 993).
95. 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
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ing sexual demands made by her supervisor. The defendant employer
had an established policy against sexual harassment and provided an
internal grievance procedure for complaints, but the plaintiff had
failed to avail herself of the established procedure.96 The Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, treating sexual harassment as "a tort-like
wrong," applied the theory of respondeat superior and found the em-
ployer liable for the supervisor's actions.97 The court reasoned that
because the supervisor was authorized to hire, fire, discipline, and
promote, it was fair to hold the employer liable under Title VII."
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Horn v. Duke
Homes" purported to follow a rule of absolute liability.100 In finding
the employer liable for the supervisor's discharge of the plaintiff for
declining to succumb to the supervisor's sexual requests, the court
opined that "It was Congress' judgment that employers, not the vic-
tims of discrimination, should bear the cost of remedying and eradi-
cating employment discrimination. The strict liability rule is admira-
bly suited for this purpose. Indeed, courts have applied this rule
without hesitation in every Title VII context except sexual
harassment."101
It should be noted that most of the cases imposing strict liability
on the employer for actions of supervisory personnel are of the quid
pro quo type, where loss of some tangible job benefit is involved.102
In this situation a supervisor uses his power to affect adversely an
employee's job in retaliation for a refusal by the employee to suc-
cumb to requests for sexual favors, thereby invoking the clout of the
employer and therefore standing in the shoes of the employer.103 One
court, however, has recently adopted the view that an employer is
strictly liable for the conduct of its supervisor when that supervisor
has created a hostile or offensive work environment even though no
loss of tangible job benefits is threatened. 04
Vinson v. Taylor'0 5 is illustrative of the trend to impute auto-
96. Id. at 213.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 755 F.2d 599 (7th Cir. 1985).
100. While the Court purported to follow a rule of absolute liability, the opinion indi-
cates that the harassment victim did complain to a higher authority. Id. at 602.
101. Id. at 605.
102. Suggs, supra note 38, at 178.
103. See. eg., Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d at 213 (the court indicated that
because the supervisor invoked his power to fire the employee, respondeat superior was
appropriate).
104. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
105. Id.
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matically liability to the employer for acts of supervisory personnel,
regardless of whether or not a loss of tangible job benefits is
threatened. In Vinson the plaintiff, a bank employee, complied with
her supervisor's demands for sex and had intercourse with him ap-
proximately forty to fifty times, apparently because she was afraid
that refusal would jeopardize her employment.' ° She alleged that at
work the supervisor followed her into the women's restroom, exposed
himself to her, made lewd remarks, and even forcibly raped her on
several occasions on the premises.10 7 The employer bank also had an
established grievance procedure.0" While the plaintiff on several oc-
casions pleaded with the supervisor to stop the harassing conduct,
she never filed a complaint under the grievance procedure. 109
The district court ordered judgment for the supervisor on all
claims finding that "Vinson was not required to grant Taylor or any
other member of the bank sexual favors as a condition of employ-
ment," and that if Vinson did engage in a sexual relationship it was
"purely a voluntary one, having nothing to do with her continued
employment at the bank or her advancement or promotions at the
institution."' 10 The district court further held that the bank, as em-
ployer, could not be held responsible for any infringements by Taylor
because "it had no notice of the offensive conduct charged to
him."'
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the district court
had erred in failing to recognize that Vinson had a Title VII claim
"simply for pervasive on-the-job sexual harassment" that "illegally
poisoned the psychological and emotional work environment," re-
gardless of the absence of any loss or threatened loss of tangible job
benefits." 2 The court of appeals also questioned the district court's
finding of voluntariness, stating that if the finding meant that there
was no harassment, then voluntariness in that sense "had no materi-
ality whatsoever" because "a woman employee need not prove resis-
tance to sexual overtures to establish a Title VII claim of sexual
harassment." ' s Furthermore, with respect to employer liability, the
court of appeals announced an unqualified rule that "employers must
106. Id. at 143.
107. Id. at 143-44.
108. Id. at 147.
109. Id.
110. The district court found that in spite of the alleged conduct, Vinson was not denied
timely promotions and salary increases. Id. at 146.
III. Id. at 147.
112. Id. at 145.
113. Id. at 146.
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answer for the sexual harassment of any subordinate by any super-
vising superior," regardless of whether or not the employer knew or
could have known of the harassment or had an opportunity to stop
it." 4 In reaching this conclusion the court reasoned that "lain em-
ployer's delegation of this much authority vests in the supervisor
such extreme power over the employee that the supervisor's stature
as 'agent' of the employer cannot be doubted."' 15
The EEOC guidelines are in accord with the position adopted
by Vinson, Horn, and Miller, making the employer strictly liable for
the acts of supervisory personnel. The guidelines provide:
Applying general Title VII principles, employer, employment
agency, joint apprenticeship, committee or labor organization
.. . is responsible for its acts and those of its agents and super-
visory employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of
whether the specific acts were forbidden by the employer and
regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known
of their occurrence."
6
Consequently, there has been substantial divergence of opinion
as to whether an employer is strictly liable for the sexually harassing
acts of its supervisory personnel, or whether the employer must re-
ceive actual or constructive notice of the conduct and fail to cure it,
in order for liability to attach. The United States Supreme Court
has recently decided the Vinson case and provided some guidelines
for determining employer liability for the harassing acts of its super-
visory personnel." 7
VI. The Supreme Court and Vinson
Because Vinson is the first sexual harassment case under Title
VII that the Supreme Court has decided, it has broad implications
for all employers and employees. Although Vinson was backed by
many women's groups, organized labor and approximately twenty-
nine members of Congress, there was still a possibility that the Su-
preme Court would reject altogether the theory of sexual harassment
as a form of sex discrimination." 8 Such a possibility was particularly
114. Id. at 149-50.
115. Id. at 150.
116. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1984).
117. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), reh'g denied 760 F.2d 1330
(D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd and remanded sub nom., Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 106 S.
Ct. 2399 (1986) [hereinafter Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson].
118. P. Dwyer, Sexual Harassment: Companies Could be Liable, Bus. WK., Mar. 31,
1986 at 35.
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true when the sexual harassment alleged was of the environmental
type.1
19
In its brief, the employer argued that Congress did not intend to
regulate the purely psychological aspects of the work environment
under Title VII. 120 In support of this position, the Bank cited numer-
ous statements made at the congressional debates supporting the
view that Title VII was meant to focus on the equality of opportu-
nity in the tangible, economic benefits of employment. 1
The view that Title VII was meant to encompass the psycholog-
ical aspects of the work environment is generally attributed to Rog-
ers v. EEOC.22 Rogers was a racial discrimination case in which the
plaintiff alleged that his employer had discriminated against him be-
cause of his Spanish origin. In his opinion, Judge Goldberg wrote
that Title VII was intended statutorily to protect "the employees
"psychological as well as economic fringes."'2 3 However, neither of
the other appellate panel members joined in the opinion; one judge
concurred in the result but rejected afiy notion of discrimination in
the psychological work environment,"" and the remaining judge dis-
sented. The dissenting judge also rejected any construction of Title
VII purporting to cover discrimination in the intangible aspects of
the working environment. 2 '
In Bundy, 2 the case that created a cause of action for environ-
mental sexual harassment, the court relied heavily on Judge
Goldberg's opinion in Rogers. The other courts finding a cause of
action to exist under Title VII for a hostile working environment
have also cited Bundy with approval. Consequently, the entire notion
of actionable environmental sexual harassment stems from Judge
Goldberg's analysis in Rogers, an analysis not developed in a sexual
harassment case, not essential to the result in that case, and in which
no other appellate panel member hearing the case concurred. The
Supreme Court, however, found that a cause of action for a harass-
ing work environment exists when the requirements of the EEOC
119. It is unclear whether Vinson falls into the environmental category or the quid pro
quo category. The court of appeals ordered the district court on remand to accept the theory of
environmental harassment. However, if it is found that Vinson quit her job as a result of the
hostile environment, the harassment would be quid pro quo since Vinson was constructively
discharged.
120. Brief of Petitioner at 30, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
121. Id. at _.
122. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
123. Id. at 238.
124. Id. at 241-42 (Godbold, J., specially concurring).
125. Id. at 245 (Roney, J., dissenting).
126. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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guidelines are met regardless of whether or not sexual harassment is
linked to the grant or denial of an economic quid pro quo.127 In
reaching its decision the Court gave great deference to the EEOC
guidelines and relied heavily on the Rogers decision. 12 8 Apparently
the Court found itself in a position where, in order to reject the the-
ory of a sexually harassing work environment, it would have had to
become entangled within the process of explaining the inherent dif-
ferences between race and sex. 129 The Court chose not to draw a
distinction between race and sex, finding that a cause of action exists
for a work environment pervaded with sexual innuendo just as in the
case of an environment filled with racial hostility.1
3 0
Arguably, there is no compelling reason for the tort-like envi-
ronmental sexual harassment to be encompassed by, and actionable
under, Title VII. Title VII provides the limited remedies of injunc-
tions, and reinstatement plus backpay.' 3 ' In the pure hostile work
environment situation, the victim still maintains her job, and suffers
no loss of pay. 3 2 If an employee experiences this type of working
environment, she would still have a tort action against the individual
in which she could obtain damages and whatever equitable relief
necessary. 33 As a result, her remedies are no more limited by re-
quiring her to proceed in this fashion rather than under Title VII. If
the employee quits as a result of the unpleasantry, a constructive
discharge results, and the harassment becomes quid pro quo. 1 '
When this occurs the employee may then proceed under Title VII to
secure reinstatement and whatever other relief is necessary.
After the Supreme Court found that Title VII encompasses en-
vironmental sexual harassment, the next question to be answered
was whether an employer could be held liable for the acts of supervi-
sory personnel even if management was not aware of the behavior
and had no opportunity to remedy the situation.'35 Employers anx-
iously awaited the Supreme Court's ruling and were greatly relieved
127. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2405 (1986).
128. 106 S. Ct. at 2405.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Young v. Southwestern Savings and Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir.
1975); see also, DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 803 (Ist Cir. 1980) (employer held liable
for constructive discharge of an employee who had been fired for absenteeism and abuse of
sick leave).
135. P. Dwyer, Sexual Harassment: Companies Could be Liable, Bus. WK. Mar. 31,
1986 at 35.
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when the Court found that employers are not automatically liable
for sexual harassment by their supervisors. 3 The Court declined to
issue a definitive ruling on the issue. Instead the Court merely laid
down guidelines, directing courts to look to traditional agency princi-
ples in deciding employer liability for the harassing acts of supervi-
sors. 137 While the Court concluded that Congress' use of the word
"agent" in defining "employer" clearly envinced its intent to place
some limits on employer liability, the Court also stated that "the
absence of notice to an employer does not necessarily insulate that
employer from liability.' 38 In addition, the Court rejected the view
that the mere existence of a grievance procedure, a policy against
discrimination, and failure to invoke the procedure on the part of the
harassed individual, will protect the employer from liability.'39
The sigh of relief breathed by employers lasted only as long as
it took to read Justice Marshall's concurring opinion, in which three
other Justices concurred.140 Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun,
and Stevens, unlike the majority of the Court, felt that the issue of
employer liability for its supervisors' actions was squarely
presented. 4' Also, unlike the majority of the Court, they concluded
that harassment by a supervisor of an employee under his supervi-
sion, should automatically be imputed to an employer when a dis-
criminatory work environment results, regardless of whether the em-
ployer had notice of the conduct." 2
Consequently, the Supreme Court's decision in Vinson, while
resolving any doubt that a cause of action for sexual harassment is
appropriate under Title VII, left the issue of employer liability for
the harassing acts of its supervisors in a state of turmoil. Several
courts which have subsequently addressed the issue of employer lia-
bility for acts of supervisory personnel have found guidance in Vin-
son, but that guidance has produced confusion and inconsistent
results. 1
3
136. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. at 2408.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 106 S. Ct. at 2409.
140. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring, joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens).
141. Id.
142. 106 S. Ct. at 2411. The Solicitor General in its amicus brief argued that while
strict liability may be appropriate when a tangible job benefit is affected, a special exception is
needed in hostile work environment cases because the supervisor "is not exercising or threaten-
ing actual or apparent authority to make personnel decisions regarding the victim." 106 S. Ct.
at 2410. However, the concurring Justice rejected this position as untenable concluding that
"it is precisely because the supervisor is understood to be clothed with the employer's authority
that he is able to impose unwelcome sexual conduct on subordinates." 106 S. Ct. at 2411.
143. See Rabidue v. Oscoola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), where the
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VII. Supervisory Acts Imputed to the Employer
Section 706(g) of Title VII imposes an "intent" requirement in
order to find an employer liable for discrimination based on sex. 44
The statute does not mention sexual harassment nor does it seem
that Congress even considered the problem when it enacted Title
VII. 1"5 The EEOC guidelines do not address the statutory intent re-
quirement and make the employer strictly liable for the acts of its
supervisors. 46
In enacting Title VII, Congress should have recognized that
most employers subject to Title VII would be companies whose busi-
ness is conducted through officers and employees. By specifically pro-
viding for an intent requirement it stands to reason that this require-
ment would be imputed. Requiring actual or constructive notice to
an employer gives effect to the intent provision while not imposing
an unreasonable burden on the harassed employee. When an em-
ployer has notice of the conduct and fails to remedy it, intent to
discriminate is fairly imputed because the employer can be said to
have endorsed the conduct. 47 Indeed, earlier sexual harassment de-
cisions seemed to recognize implicitly the employer's dilemma, find-
ing that the supervisor's conduct is too personal and cannot be con-
strued as sanctioned company policy without some sort of notice. 1 8
Additionally, the EEOC guidelines abandon a standard of strict lia-
sixth circuit, in addressing its first hostile work environment case, interpreted Vinson to impose
an additional burden on the plaintiff of proving respondeat superior liability, stating that the
employee must prove that "the employer, through its agents or supervisory personnel, knew or
should have known of the charged sexual harassment and failed to implement prompt and
appropriate corrective action." Id. at 621. However, Judge Keith dissented on the issue of
supervisor liability, relying on Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Vinson. Judge Keith
felt that liability should be imputed to the employer regardless of actual or constructive knowl-
edge. Id. at 625 (Keith, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See also Volk v. Coler, 638
F.2d 1555 (C.D. III. 1986) (court imposed additional burden on plaintiff of proving employer
knew or should have known of harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action).
144. 42 U.SC. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
145. The insertion of the word sex into the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was added at the
last minute and adopted by the House of Representatives without hearing and with little de-
bate. See generally Kanowitz, Sex Based Discrimination in American Law IlI: Title VII and
the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 305, 310-13 (1968) (discussing the legislative
history of Title VII).
146. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1984).
147. This principle finds analogues in tort law. In order to impose punitive damages on
an employer for the intentional tort of its employee, the employer must be shown to have
participated in the tort, authorized it or ratified it. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
909 (1979).
148. See, e.g., Come v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975). "A
reasonably intelligent reading of the statute demonstrates that it can only mean that an unlaw-
ful employment practice must be discrimination on the part of the employer, Bausch and
Lomb." Id.
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bility for sexual harassment by coworkers, requiring some sort of no-
tice to the employer and the employer's failure to remedy the situa-
tion.' 19 The guidelines are inconsistent. If an employer is strictly
liable for an offensive workplace environment, it should make no dif-
ference whether a coworker or a supervisor created that
environment.
While in some circumstances it may be appropriate to hold em-
ployers strictly liable for quid pro quo harassment by supervisors, it
seems inappropriate in hostile environment cases. In the quid pro
quo situation a supervisor uses the actual authority delegated to him
by the employer to affect a tangible term of employment; he can be
fairly said to be invoking the clout of the employer and therefore he
in effect becomes the employer. 150 In the hostile work environment
situation, however, the supervisor does not threaten any loss of tangi-
ble economic benefits, but rather creates an environment which is
capable of being created by any individual in the workplace. It is
submitted that, in this situation, actual or constructive notice and an
opportunity to cure should be required in order for liability to be
imputed to the employer.'
Furthermore, a company which knows that liability will auto-
matically be imputed to it may simply refuse to take this risk. As a
result, management may establish rigid policies either severely limit-
ing social encounters between supervisors and subordinates or
prohibiting them altogether. This result is undesirable because inter-
action between supervisors and subordinates can promote a friendly
working atmosphere in the same way that it can promote a hostile
149. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 142.
151. It is interesting to note that in Vinson the EEOC argued for a different standard to
be applied in hostile work environment cases. Changing its earlier position of strict employer
liability for the acts of supervisory employees, the EEOC argued that in hostile work environ-
ment cases the test should be:
Whether a victim of sexual harassment had reasonably available an avenue
of complaint regarding such harassment, and, if available and utilized, whether
that procedure was reasonably responsive to the employees complaint. If the em-
ployer has an expressed policy against sexual harassment and has implemented a
procedure specifically designed to resolve sexual harassment claims, and if the
victim does not take advantage of that procedure, the employer should be
shielded from liability absent actual knowledge of the sexually hostile environ-
ment (obtained, e.g., by the filing of a charge with the EEOC or a comparable
state agency). In all other cases, the employer will be liable if it has actual
notice of the harassment or if, considering all the facts of the case, the victim in
question had no reasonably available avenue for making his or her complaint
known to appropriate management officials.
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. at 2408 (citing Brief for United States and Equal
Opportunity Employment Commission as Amici Curiae, 26).
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atmosphere. Personal relationships between supervisors and subordi-
nates can also be an effective mechanism for enhancing work pro-
ductivity. If an employer adopts such a policy to protect itself
against Title VII liability, another dilemma results because an em-
ployee may have a tort action against the employer for adopting
such a policy. 152
The twist presented in Vinson was that the person to be notified
of the sexual harassment under the established grievance procedure
of the bank was the supervisor engaging in the harassing conduct.' 53
Complaining to this person would have been futile since it was
against the supervisor's interest to disclose his conduct to the em-
ployer. 15 "4 Traditional agency law recognizes this problem and pro-
vides that notice to an agent whose interest is adverse to the princi-
pal cannot be construed as notice to the principal. 5 5 Consequently,
requiring the employee to complain to another person in the employ-
ment hierarchy seems reasonable in such a situation, assuming that
such an individual exists.' 56
In some situations the corporate officer is so high in the com-
pany hierarchy that there is no one else to whom the harassed em-
ployee can complain. In this situation, however, the employer can be
fairly found to have constructive notice of the harassing conduct be-
cause, in effect, the corporate officer is the alter ego of the com-
pany.15 7 In any event, a broad rule purporting to hold an employer
strictly liable for supervisory personnel, regardless of that individ-
ual's status in the hierarchy, is clearly an unreasonable burden on
the employer. 5 8 At the very least, when there is someone in a higher
152. Patton v. J.C. Penney Co., 214 Daily Lab. Rep. - (1985) (rule against co-
worker dating is so outrageous that an employer enforcing such a rule may be liable for caus-
ing emotional distress).
153. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 147, n. 43.
154. The district court found that notice to Taylor could not constitute notice to the
employer. Id.
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 268 and comment C (1968).
156. In Vinson, the Division president had not been notified of the conduct. 753 F.2d at
147, n. 43.
157. See, e.g., Clark v. World Airways, Inc., 24 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 305, 310
(D.D.C. 1980). The perpetrator held the three highest corporate offices and was 80% stock-
holder and director. Knowledge of the perpetrator was imputed to the company because perpe-
trator was an "alter ego" of the company.
158. A recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit supports the notion
that an employer must receive notice and an opportunity to remedy the harassing environment
created by a supervisor, in order to be liable under Title VII. A claim for racial discrimination
was filed under Title VII against both the employer and supervisors. The court found that the
supervisors fell within the definition of employer under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(b) because they
were agents of the employer fire company. The court imposed liability on the supervisors indi-
vidually. However, in addressing the fire department's liability under Title VII the court stated
that "while the municipal department should strive to end racial discrimination within its
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position than the harassing supervisor, the employee should be re-
quired to voice her disapproval to that person, thereby presenting an
opportunity for the employer to remedy the situation.
Moreover, a rule imposing absolute liability on an employer
may even be detrimental to women in the long run because it seems
to perpetuate the stereotypic view that women are passive, meek and
helpless.1 59 A rule establishing strict employer liability fosters the
paternalistic view that women must be protected because they are
not assertive enough to complain to a higher authority.160 Title VII
was enacted as a mechanism for ridding the workplace of these
traditional stereotypic views,161 yet a rule imposing strict employer
liability without notice may have the opposite effect and serve to per-
petuate these stereotypes.
Factually, Vinson probably was not the most favorable case to
argue for strict employer liability. The employer had an established
grievance procedure; Vinson participated in forty to fifty sexual en-
counters with the supervisor over a two year period, and yet she de-
clined to file a grievance with the Equal Employment Officer who
frequently visited the branch.162 Based on these facts alone it seems
unreasonable to impose strict liability on the employer for conduct
which it could not possibly have known of and had no opportunity to
remedy.
VIII. Conclusion
While sexual harassment is a serious barrier to women achiev-
ing opportunities in employment equal to those enjoyed by men,
there are certain limits to the usefulness of Title VII in extinguishing
this barrier. Title VII was enacted to provide equality between men
and women in the tangible aspects of the workplace, and to rid the
workplace of traditional stereotypes contributing to disparate treat-
ranks, it cannot be held accountable for every bigoted act of its employees. As an employer, it
simply lacks the power to guarantee an environment free from all bigotry." Hamilton v. Rog-
ers, 783 F.2d 1306, 1309 (5th Cir. 1986). The Court then refused to impute liability to the fire
department because the high ranking officials, upon learning of the incidents, promptly acted
to discourage such conduct in the future. Id.
159. One commentator suggests that the labeling of an act for the protection of psycho-
therapy patients "The Vulnerable Adults Act," may add to the stereotype depicting women as
weak, vulnerable, and needing protection. Since the majority of claimants in sexual harass-
ment cases are women, a strict liability standard may also add to the validity of this stereo-
type. J. Bouhoutsos, Therapist-Client Sexual Involvement: A Challenge for Mental Health
Professionals and Educators, 55 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY, 177, 180 (1985).
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 230 (1982).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 106-109.
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ment with respect to those tangible aspects. Extending Title VII
principles beyond the scope for which they were intended may serve
to perpetuate stereotypes rather than eliminate them. Indeed, a rule
imposing strict liability on an employer for the acts of its supervisors
may actually foster the view that females are incapable of being as-
sertive and must be protected at all costs. While the Supreme Court
has found that Title VII was meant to protect the purely psychologi-
cal aspects of the workplace, a rule somewhere short of strict liabil-
ity is necessary. Requiring notice to the employer and an opportunity
to cure the hostile environment strikes an ideal balance between
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